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Abstract: This article argues that although some of the short-term consequences of the 
COVID-19 pandemic for international trade are potentially serious, they do not appear to  be 
unmanageable. One could therefore expect that once the pandemic disappears, or is at least 
under control, international trade will go back to business as usual. However, in the long-
term perspective the potential impact of the pandemic can be more profound than initially 
anticipated, leading to structural changes in the process of economic globalization. While the 
seeds of such a process were sown some time ago, the Covid -19 pandemic seems to 
exacerbate existing tendencies for States to turn inward and compete more openly for 
economic and political dominance in the world. In this context, the article argues that the 
extent of the potential transformation will depend, among the other things, on the length and 
severity of the current pandemic. The larger is its health and economic impact, the greater 
are chances that we will see structural changes in international trade relations. 
 




The Covid-19 pandemic has taken the world by surprise. Initially, it was seen as a Chinese, 
and later South-East Asian, problem. Decision-makers around the world apparently believed 
that the SARS-CoV-2 could be contained and controlled within the region, following a pattern 
that was evident in previous outbreaks, such as SARS.1 However, due to a combination of 
various factors of a natural, political and regulatory character,2 the disease quickly became an 
epidemic and later, when it reached other parts of the world, a pandemic. The existing 
interconnectedness among countries – one of the facets of globalization – has obviously 
facilitated this process.  
 
                                              
* This article is based on text that was published in April 2020 as The Covid-19 Pandemic and Internationa l 
Trade: Temporary Turbulence or Paradigm Shift? 11(2) European Journal of Risk Regulation 337 (2020). The 
current version has been updated and significantly revised. 
 Associate Professor, Kozminski University (Poland); Research Fellow, CSS Institu te fo r Legal Stud ies 
(Hungary); email: lgruszczynski@kozminski.edu.pl. This research has been financed by the Nat ional Science 
Centre (Poland) pursuant to grant number UMO-2018/31/B/HS5/03556. 
1 See generally, T. Abraham, Twenty-First Century Plague: The Story of SARS, Johns Hopkins University  
Press, Baltimore: 2004. 
2 The broad spread of the initial outbreak was caused by the Chinese authorities, which  ignored, for polit ical 
reasons, early signs of the unfolding epidemic. Many other countries have been also too late with their regulatory 
responses. Covid-19 as such has turned out to have a relatively high transmis sion rate, with  a considerable 
number of infected people being asymptomatic, which facilitates transmissions.  
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The pandemic has impacted almost all spheres of human activity. Nationwide lockdowns, 
closed borders, face masks in public spaces and remote work have become, within weeks, a 
new normal. Paradoxically, the world while slowing down, has also accelerated. Digital 
transformation, progressive and large-scale automation, growing inequalities (both within 
societies as well as between countries) and a shift in the economic balance, away from the 
West towards Asia are by no mean new. All these trends have been visible for at least a 
decade. What has changed, however, is the pace of the transformation. The processes that 
would normally take years are happening now.  
International trade is not an exception. The pandemic has shaken the foundation of the 
currently functioning system and has clearly a potential to leave it with permanent marks. 
What are then the consequences of the pandemic for international trade? How the future 
model of cooperation between States in this field may look like? This article is a modest 
attempt to answer these two question by identifying some of the short and long-term effects of 
the pandemic (Sections 3 and 4 respectively) and discussing one possible scenario that seems 
to be slowly emerging in the field – a divided world with less cooperation and more open 
rivalry among the States. However, the issue that needs to be addressed in the first place is the 
complex nature of the crisis caused by the pandemic. This problem is tackled in the 
subsequent section. 
 
2. The Covid-10 pandemic and three-dimensional crisis 
Initially, the pandemic has been predominantly seen as a public health problem. Indeed, as 
of October 20, 2020 there have been more than 41 million confirmed cases globally and about 
1.1 million registered deaths,3 with the United States (US), Brazil, India and Russia being the 
most affected countries. Unfortunately, these figures might be just the tip of the iceberg. The 
experts of the World Health Organization (WHO) estimated at the beginning of October 2020 
that up to 10% of the global population may have already contracted the virus,4 while the 
death toll is believed to be twice as large as the official data indicate.5 The situation will most 
probably get worse in the near future as the available epidemiological models envisage many 
                                              
3 Cf John Hopkins University & Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, available at: 
<https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html>, all internet resources last accessed on 20 October 2020. 
4 J. Keaten, 10% of the World Has Been Infected With COVID-19, WHO Estimates, The Time, 6 October 
2020, available at: <https://bit.ly/3nqY7MJ>. 




more infections and between 0.5 to 3.5 million additional deaths by 1 February 2021.6 While 
some countries have managed to establish the control over the progress of the pandemic (e.g. 
China, New Zealand, Singapore or Australia), others have not been so successful. For 
example, France, Spain, Hungary and Poland have recently entered the second wave (which is 
more severe than the previous one), while the US, Brazil, and Ukraine are still battling the 
first one.  
The ongoing public health emergency has been followed by mutually reinforcing economic 
and political crises that eventually may leave societies around the world with even deeper 
scares. As far as the economic dimension is concerned, the global GDP is expected to fall by 
4.4% this year7 (note that the financial crisis in 2008-09 only led to a 0.1% contraction). This 
is worse than initially anticipated, as the pandemic has had a more negative impact on 
economic activities in the first half of 2020 than envisioned, while the recovery has been more 
gradual than previously forecasted. Although all countries suffer, some are affected more than 
others. For example, the GDP of the US contracted by 32.9% in the second quarter of 2020 
and its economy is expected to see a negative growth of 4.3% for the entire year. An even 
more pessimistic scenario is predicted for the Euro Area, which is projected to have an 8.3% 
contraction in 2020.8 While the Central and East European (CEE) Member States of the 
European Union (EU) are expected to fare better, these predictions are highly uncertain.9 
Paradoxically, the only large country that may see economic growth this year (of 1.9%) is 
China, which apparently has successfully managed to establish control over the spread of the 
virus.10 At present the pace and extent of potential global recovery still remains an open 
question. While the third quarter of 2020 saw some rebound in economic activity, the second 
wave of the pandemic – which has already formed in many countries – may undercut this 
fragile growth. Even if this negative scenario does not happen, between 89 to 115 million 
                                              
6 See e.g. Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), Covid-19 projections, last updated 15 October 
2020, available at: <https://covid19.healthdata.org/global?view=total-deaths&tab=trend>. 
7 International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook. A Long and Difficult Ascent, October 2020, 
p.  9, available at: <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/09/30/world -economic-outlook-
october-2020>. It should be noted that this figure is better than in the June 2020 projection, which  envisaged  a 
4.9% contraction. 
8 Ibidem, p. 9. 
9 For example, the current figure for Poland is -4.6% and for Hungary -7% (European Commission, 
Economic forecast for Poland and Hungary, see respectively <https://bit.ly/34wtwoo> and 
<https://bit.ly/3jGVBQ5>). It is however not clear how the current development of the pandemic in  th es e two 
countries will impact their economic growth in the fourth quarter of 2020. 
10 IMF, supra note 7, p. 9. 
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people will be pushed into extreme poverty, particularly in low- and middle-income 
economies, by the end of this year.11  
Equally serious is the political crisis, which can manifest itself not only at the national 
level (by undermining the support for the current governments),12 but also at the regional or 
international levels. One example of the latter is the growing tension between the US and 
China, which has been fuelled by poor management of the pandemic in the US (coupled with 
the political need to find an external enemy) and the growing ambitions of China, which is 
taking advantage of the chaos that has dominated the world (e.g. by imposing the new 
security law in Hong Kong or further militarizing the Taiwan strait). The recent protests in 
Belarus and the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh have been 
linked to the pandemic as well.13 Some experts also worry about the future of the European 
integration project, pointing out the inadequate response of the EU institutions (at least in the 
initial phase of the pandemic) and rising nationalist sentiments in many EU Member States.14 
In this context it is worth noting that the European countries have mostly responded to the 
pandemic and its economic effects individually, with the EU becoming more visible only 
recently. Despite the fact that the protection of public health is a competence of the Member 
States and the Union can only intervene to support, coordinate, or complement the 
actions taken at the national level, the perception of failure of the EU institutions is quite 
common.15 Others also note that the pandemic may lead at least some EU Member States to 
move away from market-oriented policies toward more interventionist policies, creating 
additional tensions within the EU, which is centred on the creation and functioning of the 
single market.16  
There are also those who see the Covid-19 pandemic as an existential threat to liberal and 
constitutional democracy. Indeed, there are some early signs which may indicate that the 
current autocratic tendencies will be strengthened in the future. Governments in different 
                                              
11 World Bank, COVID-19 to Add as Many as 150 Million Extreme Poor by 2021, 7 October 2020, availab le 
at: <https://bit.ly/36RDaF3>. 
12 Initially the pandemic has had the opposite effect in many countries with government approval rat ings 
rising. This phenomenon is labelled by social psychologist as a rally-round-the-flag effect. See K. Chi Yam, J.C. 
Jackson, C.M. Barnes, J. Lau, X. Qin, and H. Yeung Lee, The rise of COVID-19 cases is associated with support 
for world leaders, 117(41) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 25429 (2020). 
13 A. Troianovski, Putin, Long the Sower of Instability, Is Now Surrounded by It, The New York Times , 7 
October 2020, available at: <https://nyti.ms/3dce8Bl>. 
14 G. Celi, D. Guarascio and A. Simonazzi, A fragile and divided European Union meets Covid-19: further 
disintegration or ‘Hamiltonian moment’?, 47 Journal of Industrial and Business Economics  411 (2020).  
15 L. Laurent, The EU’s Big Pandemic Failure Isn't About Money, Bloomberg, 14 April 2020, availab le at : 
<https://bloom.bg/3lAV8j9>. 
16 P. Bergsen, A. Billon-Galland, H. Kundnani, V. Ntousas, T. Raines, Europe after Coronavirus: The EU 
and a New Political Economy, Chatham House Research Paper, June 2020, p. 1.     
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parts of the world are using the pandemic as an excuse to restrict freedoms, punish 
independent news operations, and attack minorities. The recent report by the Freedom House 
shows, for example, that democracy has weakened in 80 countries (including Hungary17) and 
become stronger in only one country, thus reinforcing a trend that has been observable over 
the last fourteen years.18  
When taken together, it is therefore not surprising that many commentators predict 
growing chaos and increasing poverty in the upcoming future, as well as the reversal of 
various processes that have shaped the world as we know it today.19 These changes are also 
expected to affect international trade and its governance structures, the issue that is addressed 
in two subsequent sections. 
 
3. Short-term consequences for international trade 
The Covid-19 outbreak has already caused a deep disruption in world trade, affecting both 
the supply and demand side of the global economy. In the first phase of the pandemic many 
governments ordered the temporary closure of non-essential manufacturing facilities, while 
numerous corporations either took such measures voluntarily (in part because of reductions in 
the supply of labour) or simply decreased production due to disruptions in their supply chains. 
Although most of these production sites have already reopened, frequently their output is still 
below the pre-pandemic level. The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic is however most visible 
in the international service sector. The main victims are international tourism, passenger air 
travel, and container shipping. Global financial transactions, as well as information and 
communications technology services, have also declined significantly.20 Moreover, according 
to the recent UNCTAD forecast, the pandemic will cause global foreign direct investments (a 
part of which fall within mode 3 of the transnational supply of services) to shrink by 40% in 
2020.21 The demand side has been also affected, as consumers around the globe are unwilling 
at the moment to spend their money. This phenomenon can be attributed to a common fear of 
loss of income (e.g. due to unemployment) and heightened uncertainty. Overall, the World 
                                              
17 For details see e.g. T. Drinóczi and A. Bień-Kacała, COVID-19 in Hungary and Poland: extraordinary 
situation and illiberal constitutionalism, 8(1-2) The Theory and Practice of Legislation 171-192 (2020). 
18 Freedom House, Democracy under Lockdown, October 2020, available at: <https://bit.ly/3iI83O8>.  
19 For an interesting overview of different narratives on the Covid-19 pandemic and its consequences for the 
process of globalization, see A. Roberts, N. Lamp, Is the Virus Killing Globalization? There’s No One Answer , 
Barron’s, 15 March 2020, available at: <https://bit.ly/39EQiuB>. 
20 WTO, Services Trade Barometer, 17 September 2020, available at: 
<https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/wtoi_17sep20_e.pdf> (note that these data cover June 2020).  
21 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2020. International Production beyond the Pandemic , 
UNCTAD/WIR/2020, June 2020. 
6 
 
Trade Organization (WTO) predicts a 9.2% decline in world merchandise trade for 202022 
(which is however a much better figure than the initial estimates provided by the organization 
in April, which fell within the -13% and -32% range23). At the same time, the WTO envisages 
a rebound of 7.2% in 2021. Since this will not compensate for the losses in 2020, the WTO 
describes the potential rebound as “being closer to the ‘weak recovery’ scenario than to a 
‘quick return to trend’.”24 Of course, all these estimates are subject to a high degree of 
uncertainty and depend on the progress of the pandemic and the regulatory responses to it.  
Recent months have also seen a significant increase in States’ recourse to Covid-19-related 
trade policy measures. In particular, some countries have decided to establish export controls 
over certain medical products (e.g. medical ventilators, certain drugs, personal protective 
equipment) in the form of temporary export bans, or the addition of licensing/authorization 
requirements.25 Other countries, concerned with the security of their food supplies, have 
introduced export restrictions on specific agricultural products (altogether these export 
barriers covered almost 4% of the caloric value of globally-traded food26). Border restrictions 
have also affected the movement of people that are employed (normally on a temporary basis) 
in the agricultural sector, leading to labour shortages. All of these phenomena have generated 
genuine concerns about a potential lack of a sufficient amount of available food on the global 
market in the second part of the year.27 The problem appeared sufficiently serious that it has 
led to a joint statement by the Directors-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), the WHO, and the WTO, in which they noted that “uncertainty about food 
availability can spark a wave of [additional] export restrictions, creating a shortage on the 
global market.” In this context, they called on countries to ensure that their trade-related 
                                              
22 WTO, Trade shows signs of rebound from COVID-19, recovery still uncertain, 6 October 2020, availab le 
at: <https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr862_e.htm>. 
23 WTO, Trade set to plunge as COVID-19 pandemic upends global economy, 8 April 2020, availab le at : 
<https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr855_e.htm>. 
24 WTO, supra note 22. 
25 For up-to-date list of those measures see the database prepared by the WTO (COVID-19: Measures 
affecting trade in goods), available at: <https://bit.ly/3jMZuTJ>. In principle those measures are WTO-
consistent. While they may be regarded as prohibited quantitative restrictions on export , they are po tent ially  
justified as necessary to protect public health. Of course, they need to be app lied in  a manner that  does no t 
discriminate between WTO Members and cannot constitute a disguised restriction on internat ional t rade.  See 
also WTO, Export Prohibitions and Restrictions. Information Note , 23 April 2020, available at: 
<https://bit.ly/3lJ4gCp> and J. Lawrence, Covid-19, Export Restrictions, and  the WTO: Magnifying Global 
Divisions in a Time of Crisis, in C. Ferstman, A. Fagan (eds.), Covid-19, Law and Human Rights: Essex 
Dialogues, University of Essex, Colchester: 2020, pp. 107 et seq. 
26 D. Laborde, W. Martin, J. Swinnen, and R. Vos, COVID-19 risks to global food security, 369(6503) 
Science 500 (2020). 
27 International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Policy Brief: COVID-19 and Food  Export  
Restrictions, 2020, available at: <https://bit.ly/2SBL2Cd>. 
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measures do not disrupt the food supply chains.28 Fortunately, so far this negative scenario 
has not materialized. There have been only a few cases of significant disruptions in supply 
chains, and the world prices for staple foods (e.g. wheat, rice, corn), while remaining volatile, 
have not increased substantially. At the same time, during the summer most of the export 
restrictions were lifted by the governments.29 Again however, the situation is highly uncertain 
and may change quickly, depending on the development of the pandemic. 
It would be a mistake to think that the current epidemiological situation has only resulted 
in a wave of trade restrictions. The picture is much more complex. In fact, a number of States 
have removed or suspended some of their trade controls. For example, Argentina has 
suspended its anti-dumping duties on imports of certain medical products from China, while 
Canada has temporarily eliminated tariffs for specific categories of products if they are 
imported by public health agencies, hospitals and testing sites, or for use by first response 
organizations.30 The aim of these measures is to ensure that there are sufficient supplies of 
such needed items to domestic markets. Interestingly, some trade restrictions have been 
reduced – at least temporarily – even between the US and China, the two rivals who have 
been stuck in a trade war for the last two years. In particular, the United States has decided to 
exclude a range of medical protective gear and equipment from additional duties previously 
imposed under its Section 301, and new products may be added to that list in the future. 
Similarly, China has granted temporary exclusions for certain US goods (e.g. reagents or 
disinfectants) from its counter-duties.31 
The pandemic has also slowed down the pace of various international trade negotiations 
around the globe, as well as the execution of existing trade agreements, as States have been 
preoccupied with the public health crisis. Sometimes, the delay has been small, as in case of 
the new agreement between the United States, Mexico and Canada (the so-called USMCA) 
that has replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The initial plan for 
the entry into force was set for 1 June 2020, but actually took place one month later32 
(arguably thanks to the determination of the US administration to announce a major success 
                                              
28 Joint Statement by QU Dongyu, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus and Roberto Azevêdo, Directors -General 
of FAO, WHO and WTO, 31 March 2020, available at: <https://bit.ly/3433Uis>. 
29 Laborde et al. supra note 26. 
30 WTO (COVID-19: Measures affecting trade in goods), supra note 25. 
31 D.W. Layton, J. Zhang, and H. Li, The Impact of COVID-19 on the US-China Trade Relationship, Mayer 
Brown, 13 March 2020, available at: <https://bit.ly/39zCXE1>.  
32 US Department of State, Entry into Force of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement – Press 




before the presidential election). More serious problems have emerged in the context of the 
implementation of the US–China Phase 1 trade deal33 concluded in January 2020, which 
constitutes the preliminary agreement that establishes the prerequisites for ending (again, at 
least temporarily) the trade war between the two countries. On its basis China undertook to 
purchase more US goods and services, while the US agreed to lower some of its tariffs 
introduced for Chinese products between 2017-19. While both countries regularly re-affirm 
their commitments,34 the actual implementation level is rather low (overall below 50% of the 
year-to-date targets). For certain commodities, such as agricultural or energy products, the 
figures are even lower.35 
On the other side of the Atlantic, talks between the United Kingdom (UK) and the EU over 
future trade relations have made very little progress.36 According to the withdrawal 
agreement,37 the transition period for the UK ends on 31 December 2020. If no deal is 
reached, then border controls will return and British access to the European market will be 
severely restricted (and vice versa), while mutual trade relations will be governed by the 
WTO rules (which are largely insufficient given the size and scale of the trade between the 
two partners), and be subject to the partially paralyzed dispute settlement mechanism 
provided by the organization.38 That seems to be a very unappealing option, particularly for 
the post-Covid-19 world, so one may expect to see (despite all the statements to the contrary 
from Prime Minister Johnson39) either an extension of the deadline or a last-moment deal with 
far-reaching concessions from the UK, being a country that has more to lose.   
                                              
33 Economic and Trade Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China: Phase One, signed on 15 January 2020, entry in to  fo rce on 14 
February 2020. 
34 Most recently in August 2020 (see E. Beech, R. Liu, U.S., China reaffirm commitment to  Phase 1  t rade 
deal in phone call, Reuters, 25 August 2020, available at: <https://reut.rs/2GMXTPl/>). 
35 For an excellent tracker of the implementation agreement, see Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, US-China phase one tracker: China’s purchases of US goods, available at: <https://bit.ly/2IcjAJg>. 
36 See e.g. L. O’Carroll, P. Walker, Michel Barnier ‘worried and disappointed’ over Brexit  ta lks impasse , 
Guardian, 2 September 2020, available at: <https://bit.ly/3iE5TiI>. 
37 Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the 
European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, signed on 17 October 2019, ent ry  in to  fo rce 1 
February 2020. 
38 For more details, see B. Hoekman and P. Mavroidis, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Appel la te Body 
Crisis. Back to the Future?, Bertelsmann Stiftung: 2020. 
39 J. Lawless, Johnson says UK will quit Brexit talks if no deal by Oct 15 , The Associated Press, 6 September 
2020, available at: <https://bit.ly/318Yhim>. 
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The negotiations over the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP),40 
which will connect 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with 
China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, have also slowed down due to the 
pandemic, although eventually some significant progress has been made in 2020.41 The 
current plan is to sign the agreement (or at least an agreement in principle) in November 
2020, but that deadline may be unrealistic. Nevertheless, these negotiations seem to be largely 
unaffected by the pandemic. This can be explained not only by the determination of China, 
but also by the fact that most of the participating countries have been quite successful in 
containing the pandemic. 
 
4. Long-term consequences for international trade  
The global economy is built on the specialization of labour across countries. In line with 
the theory of comparative advantage, which provides the foundation for the current system of 
the international exchange of goods and services, such specialization allows for maximization 
of the total output and overall improvement in welfare. The Covid-19 pandemic has shown 
however that the clear benefits of the system come with costs. As noted by two 
commentators, “single-source providers, or regions of the world that specialize in one 
particular product, can create unexpected fragility in moments of crisis, causing supply chains 
to break down.”42 Such disruptions can have significant impacts, both on individual 
companies as well as on global networks of supply chains. For example, China is the 
dominant global supplier of active pharmaceutical ingredients for many important 
medications. In 2018, it accounted for 95% of the United States imports of ibuprofen, 91% of 
hydrocortisone, 40-45% of penicillin, and 40% of heparin.43 Such a situation becomes 
particularly problematic in times of crisis, when production facilities are not fully operational 
while the demands of the domestic markets may require countries to redirect part of the 
export. This is also true for other sectors, even if the consequences of possible disruptions are 
not so dramatic. 
                                              
40 For more generally on the RCEP, see M. Dian, and S. Menegazzi, New Regional Initiatives in  China’s 
Foreign Policy. The Incoming Pluralism of Global Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham: 2018 (particularly  
Chapter 5).  
41 RCEP states make ‘significant’ progress in trade talks without India , Japan Times, 27 August 2020, 
available at: <https://www.bilaterals.org/?rcep-states-make-significant&lang=en>. 
42 H. Farrell and A. Newman, Will the Coronavirus End Globalization as We Know It? , Foreign A ffairs , 16 
March 2020, available at: <https://fam.ag/2QYcdXg>. 
43 D. Palmer and F. Bermingham, U.S. policymakers worry about China ‘weaponizing’ drug exports, 
Politico, 20 December 2019, available at: <https://politi.co/2QXHidx>. 
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This newly discovered risk may eventually lead to profound changes in existing supply 
chains. The early signs of such a process were already visible even before the pandemic. The 
Trump Administration was pressuring American companies (albeit for different reasons) to 
move their production facilities back to the United States, or at least outside of China.44 The 
2017 US National Security Strategy explicitly identified economic security as a part of 
national security.45 In 2019 Taiwan launched a three-year incentive programme to promote a 
so-called “non-red supply chain”, encouraging China-based Taiwanese companies to return 
home.46 The idea of “China plus one” has been also gaining some traction among 
multinational corporations.47 Although all these efforts have had only limited success so far,48 
the Covid-19 pandemic may accelerate the relevant changes. Remarkably, it seems that both 
private companies and governments (not only in the US but also elsewhere) may now be 
genuinely interested in introducing such modifications. On the one hand, shortening and 
diversifying supply chains can be a rational and attractive strategy for private companies, 
which will allow them to ensure smoother operations and reduce the risks of supply shortages 
(which were prevalent in the initial phase of the pandemic). Consequently, the supply chains 
will be designed not only on the basis of cost efficiency but also taking into account risk 
management considerations. On the other hand, for the governments this may be a way of 
limiting dependence on China (or any other country that dominates their supplies). Such a 
move may not only make them better prepared for potential future crises, but also decrease 
the geopolitical leverage held by China due to its control over the global supply chains (recall, 
for example, that China threated to withhold supplies of medical equipment to the US and 
Europe49). From both perspectives, the modification of the existing supply chains can be seen 
                                              
44 J.R. Reed, President Trump ordered US firms to ditch China, but many already have and more are o n the 
way, CNBC, 1 September 2019, available at: <https://cnb.cx/3aLGh0p>. For an analysis of the American t rade 
policy under President Trump, see L. Gruszczynski, J. Lawrence, Trump, International Trade and Populism , 49 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 19 (2018). 
45 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, availab le at : 
<https://bit.ly/3nHTpKw>. 
46 Action Plan for Welcoming Overseas Taiwanese Businesses to Return to Invest in Taiwan. The program 
aims at Taiwanese companies that have been operating in China for at least two years and which have been h it  
by the U.S.-China trade war (for more details see Executive Yuan, available at: https://bit.ly/36TfuzT). 
47 The strategy is aimed at reducing dependence on China by moving some of the production to  one o f the 
developing countries in the Southeast Asia region. This has been done not only to increase the safety o f s upply  
chains, but also in order to address the problem of rising production costs in China. See als o  K. Iida, Japan’s 
Security and Economic Dependence on China and the United States, Routledge, New York: 2018, pp . 156 et  
seq. 
48 Z. Erchi, Q. Tong, and M. Yelin, Despite Attempts to Lure Them Away, Multinat ionals A ren’t Leaving  
China, Caixing Global Business and Tech, 21 May 2020, available at: <https://bit.ly/2Hi5w08>. 
49 S. Lau, EU toned down report on Chinese disinformation after Beijing threatened ‘repercussions’, 
diplomatic sources say, South China Morning Post, 25 April 2020, available at: <https://bit.ly/37h8htB>. 
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as way of addressing the existing strategic vulnerabilities in the economic sphere. This way of 
thinking is well illustrated by the recent statement of the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, 
who stressed the need to “fundamentally review our [US] supply chains and make sure that 
we know those supply chains and have control over them for moments just like this.”50  
Indeed, a number of countries have taken steps during the pandemic to address the problem 
of vulnerabilities in their supply chains, and the actual or potential strategic dominance of 
China in specific sectors of the global economy. The US continues to employ an aggressive 
trade policy that targets selected areas deemed to be strategic (e.g. most recently various 
Chinese internet service providers) and to pressure other countries to restrict access to their 
markets for Chinese telecommunication technologies (e.g. 5G networks),51 or tries to cut off 
the supplies of essential components to China (e.g. semiconductors).52 The US lawmakers are 
also discussing the creation – as a part of the next fiscal stimulus to offset the coronavirus 
downturn – of a special fund in the form of tax breaks and subsidies that would assist 
American companies to relocate their operations back in the US.53 A similar incentive 
programme has been already created by Japan, which has reserved funds, within its Covid-19 
emergency economic package, to help domestic companies to move their production back to 
Japan (for high added value goods), or to diversify their production base in Southeast Asia 
(for other products).54 India has recently announced a special welcome programme for foreign 
companies in specific sectors that wish to move away from China.55 At the same time, the 
Indian government cut off a number of the leading Chinese apps from the domestic market, 
citing data protection concerns.56 The problem of trade dependencies and China-dominated 
supply chains is also discussed in the European Union,57 Australia,58 and Canada59 (and some 
                                              
50 Secretary Michael R. Pompeo With Hugh Hewitt of The Hugh Hewitt Show, U.S. Department of State, 26 
March 2020 <https://bit.ly/2UyjGyn>. 
51 N.T. Lee, Navigating the U.S.-China 5G Competition, Brookings, April 2020. 
52 See e.g. J. Zhang and S. Zheng, US-China tech war: battle over semiconductors, Taiwan stokes trade feud , 
South China Morning Post, 22 September 2020, available at: <https://bit.ly/2FiXVxM>. 
53 A. Shalal, A. Alper and P. Zengerle, U.S. mulls paying companies, tax breaks to pull supply cha ins from 
China, Reuters, 18 May 2020, available at: <https://reut.rs/33Qoy6K>. 
54 K. Nakazawa, Xi fears Japan-led manufacturing exodus from China, Nikkei Asia, 16 April 2020, available 
at: <https://s.nikkei.com/2Fj2t7l>. 
55 V. Beniwal, China’s Loss May Be India’s Gain in Shifting Supply Chains, Bloomberg, 17 September 2020, 
available at: <https://bloom.bg/36WyEVt>. 
56 Agence France-Presse, India bans 118 Chinese apps, accusing companies of stealing data, The Guard ian, 
3 September 2020, available at: <https://bit.ly/34HJrjO>. 
57 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels, 24 July 2020, 
COM(2020) 605 final. 
58 See e.g. Supply Chain Resilience Initiative announced by the Australian government on 1 October 2020 
(see <https://www.industry.gov.au/news-media/meeting-our-needs-in-times-of-crisis>)  
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of them have taken first steps to implement specific plans). In particular, India, Japan and 
Australia have recently commenced a dialogue on the creation of a trilateral Supply Chain 
Resilience Initiative in order to reduce their reliance on China.60 The US is also pushing for 
the creation of the so-called Economic Prosperity Network, which would form an alliance of 
trusted partners that cooperate in the areas of trade, health, and development. This group is 
expected to include, in addition to the US, Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, 
and Vietnam.61 
It also seems that the tougher approach to China will be followed in the US regardless of 
who wins the upcoming presidential election. In the past, regulatory initiatives aimed at 
addressing vulnerabilities in the supply chains have attracted bipartisan support in the US 
Congress.62 More generally, the Republicans and Democrats appear to increasingly agree that 
China is a strategic rival which constitutes an existential threat to the US hegemony. In this 
narrative, the trade relations between two countries are primarily seen in terms of competition 
rather than cooperation. Interestingly, Joe Biden has also announced his plan to rebuild the 
existing supply chains, making it one of the issues in the upcoming election. While improving 
supply chains that are critical to fight against Covid-19 is a rather uncontroversial proposal, 
the plan is much broader in its scope and also mentions “a range of critical products … in a 
number of areas, including energy and grid resilience technologies, semiconductors, key 
electronics and related technologies, telecommunications infrastructure, and key raw 
materials.”63 The plan also calls for a periodic review of the US supply chain vulnerabilities. 
However many commentators, drawing on historical parallels, go even further and argue 
that  the Covid-19 pandemic may be a turning point in the process of economic globalization, 
resulting in a deep and lasting transformation of the existing interdependences between 
countries.64 This new world, if it emerges as projected, will be characterized by tighter 
immigration rules, new trade and investment barriers, and a technological race and 
decoupling. While I do not believe that Covid-19 pandemic is a turning point for economic 
                                                                                                                                               
59 See e.g. The Institute of Peace and Diplomacy, Securing Canada’s Supply Chain in  the post-pandemic 
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globalization, I share the opinion of those who argue that the pandemic will strengthen and 
accelerate different processes that have already been taking place in the area of international 
trade relations for some time.65  
Multilateralism,66 which has served as a foundation for international cooperation over the 
past several decades (including trade relations), is in clear decline.67 The great powers – both 
established and emerging ones – apparently prefer uni- and bilateral strategies – which 
maximize their political leverage rather than diluting it in multilateral fora – as more effective 
ways to control the course of international affairs.68 Paradoxically, also some smaller nations 
seem to be frustrated by the functioning of various international organizations and the 
operation of international multilateral arrangements, believing that they fail to deliver on their 
declared goals, or suffer from political biases that are embedded in their institutional 
structures.69 Since multilateralism has been traditionally associated with a certain 
“constitutional” vision of the world that calls for open markets, international institutions, 
common security, progressive change, collective problem-solving, shared sovereignty, and 
respect for the rule of law,70 its demise also means that all these components are questioned. 
International trade seems to fit well into the above picture. Economic integration has been 
characterized for years by a process of dynamic expansion of regional initiatives, with the 
multilateral liberalization efforts stalled.71 However, the real blow to global trade governance 
structures came with the election of Donald Trump as new US President. The launch of the 
trade war against China; the imposition of unilateral trade sanctions on other WTO Members; 
and blocking the appointment of the new members of the Appellate Body have together 
severely undermined the position of the organization and eventually led to the partial 
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paralysis of its dispute settlement mechanism.72 But trade restrictions have been on the rise in 
other parts of the world as well and the weakened WTO will make this process only easier 
and more attractive.73 Even the EU, which is traditionally very open to international trade, has 
recently taken a more assertive stance in its willingness to impose its anti-dumping duties, 
countervailing measures, and trade sanctions more vigorously (although within the frames 
established by the WTO).74 Throughout the world countries have also more frequently than in 
the past come to refer to national security when justifying their trade restrictive measures.75 
Technological decoupling – seen by both China and the United States in terms of competition 
for global technological supremacy – has been an important part of their trade war.76 All these 
developments hardly seem to be compatible with the ideas of open markets, cost efficiency, 
global competition and rule of law, all of which are the essence of the WTO. Similar 
developments can be seen in the area of foreign direct investments, which have come under 
stricter scrutiny as a number of countries have introduced special screening mechanisms.77 
The rise of economic nationalism is also reflected in the positions held by major political 
parties around the globe. For example, the recent report prepared for the Peterson Institute for 
International Economics found that political parties in developed economies have generally 
become more nationalist on issues related to trade, while in developing countries with respect 
to industrial policy.78  
The Covid-19 pandemic clearly has the potential to strengthen these trends. As discussed 
above, countries now take more seriously the existing dependencies (both in term of supply 
chains and capital) in an attempt to better insulate their economies against future shocks. In 
the future, they may also be more willing to introduce trade protectionist measures, this time 
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to shield the weakened economies battling with or emerging from the unfolding economic 
crisis. In a similar vein, restrictions on foreign direct investments may become more prevalent 
as they will aim at preventing the acquisition of depreciated assets by foreign investors. The 
signs of this process are actually already visible.79 This scenario becomes even more probable 
when one recognizes that the impact of the pandemic on different countries is distributed 
unequally, with some clear winners and losers. On the basis of the currently available 
economic data, it appears that China will emerge from the crisis stronger, while the US and 
Western Europe will relatively lose.80  
As elegantly summarized by Roberts, Choes Moraes and Ferguson in their article, which 
nota bene was published before the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, “[r]ecent 
developments suggest that the international economic order is transitioning away from the 
post-Cold War Neoliberal Order toward a new Geoeconomic Order. The shift to this new 
order, which is characterized by a growing ‘securitisation of economic policy and 
economisation of strategic policy’, will likely see the rules, norms, and institutions of 
international trade and investment law undergoing significant change.”81 The Covid-19 
pandemic seems to expose the existing tensions between the countries, and has “reinforced 
the fundamental characteristics of geopolitics today,”82 which is based on competition rather 
than cooperation, relative rather than absolute gains, and overriding security considerations. 
The central place in this new order will be reserved for States rather than for international 
institutions (which are now one of the pillars of multilateral international cooperation in trade 
matters and beyond).83 The States’ elevated position will be not only a result of their newly 
reclaimed sovereignty,84 but also a consequence of the absence of an effective and 
comprehensive global response to the pandemic,85 the lack of which has forced the countries 
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to address their health, economic, and security crises on their own.86 Such a shift from 
international to national may actually be finding support in large segments of the societies 
around the globe. Historically speaking, during pandemics societies tend to become more self-
reliant and closed. Foreigners and minorities are blamed for all the evils (think, for example, 
about Trump’s insistence on using the term “Chinese Virus), barriers to the outside world are 
erected while xenophobia and racism are on the rise.87 
 
5. Conclusions 
Although some of the short-term consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic for international 
trade are serious, they do not appear to be unmanageable. Looking at the situation from this 
perspective, one could expect that once the pandemic disappears (or is at least is under 
control), international trade will go back to business as usual. However, depending on its 
length and severity the potential impact of the pandemic may be more profound than initially 
anticipated, leading to structural changes in the process of economic globalization. While the 
seeds of such a process were sown some time ago, the Covid-19 pandemic may exacerbate the 
existing tendencies on the part of States to turn inward and compete more openly for 
economic and political dominance in the world. Whether this will lead to the resurrection of 
national states (as suggested above) or rather to a segmentation of the world that will be based 
on the regional economic blocs created around the local hegemons (e.g. the US, EU and 
China) that compete against each other in the global power game is still an open question. The 
speed and the extent of transformation will also depend, as noted above, on the length and 
severity of the current pandemic. The greater its impact, the greater are the chances that we 
will see structural changes in international trade relations and global economic governance 
structures.  
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